

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Nation Building: An Essential Army Task

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ABSTRACT

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Over the last decade national leaders and senior defense officials have backed away from the concept of nation building as a principal task for our military forces. Current military doctrine provides minimal direction or insight into how military forces will be used in an environment requiring the establishment of effective governing mechanisms to ensure long-term stability. However our experience in the aftermath of the Cold War and now in the midst of the War on Terrorism finds United States forces increasingly employed within the regions of failed nations or warring states. These actions are described as smaller-scale contingency (SSC) peacetime support or stability operations. What they have in common is an evolution into long term engagements of U.S. and Allied forces with an uncertain outcome that is dependent on the ability of the states in question to establish their own forms of peaceful governance. The continuing intransigence of these areas could be viewed as strategic ineffectiveness for the United States in its pursuit of national policy objectives. The recently released National Security Strategy calls for the development of stable democratic governments as a strategic end within our sphere of vital interests. Nation building thus becomes an acknowledged requirement to achieve this strategic objective. The Army in nearly all cases is the element of U.S. power that is most capable of establishing the conditions to begin effective nation building efforts within a failed nation or warring states.

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NATION BUILDING: AN ESSENTIAL ARMY TASK

In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity... the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.

?George Bush¹

The end of the Cold War created opportunities for monumental shifts in the alignment of nations. No longer was world alignment seen based on two competing spheres of influence. This loosening of geostrategic hegemony by two super powers ushered in a period of hope and uncertainty. There was great hope for a peace dividend on the part of the United States and its European allies, while the states of the former Soviet Union looked inward to attempt to resolve crushing domestic problems. Military forces were downsized, defense budgets were cut, and doctrine was revised. Former communist and developing nations, no longer constrained by the coercive power of superpower interests, began journeys of self determination for which they were unprepared both socially and economically.

The idealist school championed that the world would become safer, more harmonious and that fledgling democracies would flourish. The realist actuality proved fundamentally different. Heretofore ignored or stifled factors of ethnic, racial or religious strife blossomed into full intolerance. A lack of effective liberal justice mechanisms or a public recognition of the rule of law allowed oppressive regimes or criminal forces to become dominant in some nations or states. Command economies or historical barter economies were unable to modernize sufficiently to enter the world economy on an even footing or even to meet the basic needs of the populace. Not coincidentally during this period the burgeoning effects of globalization put tremendous strain on what fragile economic frameworks existed in these same nations.

Collectively, the major nations looked inward and focused attention on domestic and economic priorities rather than on international engagement. The United Nations became the dominant forum for debates about assistance or intervention in failing states. Although expansive with rhetoric about assisting nations, the powers of the world failed to actively ascertain the scope of the problems developing in failing states. In many instances regional politics worked at cross-purpose to allowing early resolution or preventive intervention.

The results are now clear, a near pandemic in increased violence and incapacity to foster peaceful and productive environments for a large portion of the world's population. The most egregious situations are well known – Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

WEAK OR FAILING NATIONS PROVE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH INSTITUTIONS FOR PEACEFUL GOVERNANCE.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of international fragmentation. The previous bipolar structure provided some measure of stability (or indifference) for nearly all nations. Nations who had survived within the cocoon of super power influence now had to transform themselves into independent members of the international community. Many succeeded, however many more proved unable to meet the challenge. This fragmentation of international order begot what we now call a process of retribalization, during which deep-seated allegiances of ethnicity, religious fundamentalism, and nationalism are asserted. These divisions coupled with fragile economies and weak or fledgling governments produce societies that fracture and more often than not descend into violent conflict².

CRISES AND INTERVENTION BECOME THE NORM

The effects of retribalization dramatically increased the number of areas in conflict or crisis throughout the world. The majority of these crisis situations are not between nations, but rather within the confines of recognized territorial boundaries of existing nations or states. The spectrum of crisis ranges from a need for humanitarian assistance to full scale armed combat between belligerent factions. What generally characterizes these crises is an incapacity to resolve the problem internally, which leads to an outside intervention by other countries to seek a resolution of conflict. As a whole we consider these actions smaller scale contingencies (SSCs). There are now 192 countries in the United Nations, over the last decade there have been nearly an equal number of interventions worldwide. Since 1993, the United States military has been involved in over 175 of these SSCs.³

To say that the United Nations and great powers were unprepared to deal with the proliferation of these crises is an understatement of considerable consequence. The human toll in the last decade in these conflicts is over 8 million persons killed and another 4 million displaced.⁴ As mentioned previously, while much rhetoric may have been expended, insufficient resources were applied to resolve these situations until such time as an international crisis was perceived.

A consequence of this delayed response syndrome was an astonishing proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that organized to tackle particular issues. It is estimated that over 20,000 NGOs now exist, each organized to take on their particular cause, e.g. land mine removal or hunger relief. Some of these NGOs are regional; others are international in scope. NGOs often take up the slack in those areas that are not deemed critical

enough for international action, however these NGOs may often be a hindrance in crises with a high level of violence.

NATION BUILDING IS AN IMPERATIVE TO ESTABLISH PEACEFUL GOVERNANCE

What is nation building? An exhaustive search through the Internet, various governmental databases, online dictionaries and thesaurus, and military databases yields no definition. It seems to be one of those terms that everyone understands yet no one can define. One can find examples that worked, and point to failures as well. Any definition also rests on the individual terms of reference that one uses to define a functioning capable society. Our military doctrine refers to nation assistance, but this is an activity that assumes an invitation to help is requested, which certainly is not the case in most of the areas in which we are now engaged in nation building activities. For the purpose of this paper, nation building is the sum of activities undertaken diplomatically, economically, militarily, and informationally to bring a failed state or nation to a position of independent capability to provide for its people in terms that are clearly understood by the international community. To whit, a peaceful society based on a respect for the rule of law, with a respect for human rights and political freedom, with a functioning representative government, sustainable economy, and safe basic infrastructure.

The primary dilemma that confronts the world today is a necessity to establish governments in areas of conflict that are able to provide peace, stability, and meet the basic human needs for health and prosperity. Building national governments that have the capacity to meet the needs of the populace is often a daunting task. Many factors affect the capacity of each government to successfully achieve this objective. Incapacity to govern may stem from geographical, natural, and physical factors. Other countries face historical and political circumstance, cultural traditions that reject modernization, or multiethnic traditions that must be reconciled before an effective form of government can take hold. Most devastating though is the effect of destructive decisions by corrupt leaders. The common thread for all these troubled states and for the international community is that failure to act or assist more often than not leads to a downward spiral that devolves into internal anarchy and violence. To some extent, the spillover effect from each resulting conflict jeopardizes the stability of the international order as a whole.⁵

The range of available options to deal with these areas of conflict is as varied as the conflicts themselves. The entire range of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic options may be employed. In many areas the problems are related to a lack of natural resources, infrastructure, education, and modernization to support economic advancement. In

these cases there are numerous international resources available to provide assistance. Substantial portions of the United Nations efforts are directed toward these states. The efforts of NGOs in these areas often become paramount.

For those areas that have descended into violence direct intervention is often the only feasible solution to restore order. In nearly all cases the primary element of power to be employed at the outset of an intervention is military. Currently we describe these actions as peacekeeping operations (PKO) or peace engagement operations (PEO), the difference being in the preemptive or postemptive aspect of the intervention to the cycle of violence. What we can learn from recent history over the last decade is that once military forces are employed it becomes exceedingly difficult to disengage them. External military force is normally required until such time as a true respect for the rule of law is established, with an effective judiciary system, and a trusted indigenous military and police force are developed.⁶

ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW.

Fundamentally a society cannot function without regard to some norms or codification of social standards. Wanton disregard for accepted standards or norms leads to anarchy. Establishing a rule of law within a zone of conflict is the foremost requirement to begin stabilizing a disrupted society. Once again the spectrum of ordered society and rule of law may be quite varied, from the strict codification of the Sharia to that of liberal western democracy. However, what is inarguably apparent is that a fractured, failing, warring and violent society cannot begin to rebuild itself until such time that a general respect for authority is achieved. A truly peaceful, productive environment does not become a reality until a genuine belief and adherence to the rule of law is established.

A principal lesson learned by the Army from experience in Bosnia is that irrespective of a PEO or PKO the presence of an effective external military force is the essential requirement to begin to establish rule of law. A fractured society generally is incapable of developing or continuing trust of the indigenous police or military force. The mere fact of association with a failed system garners illegitimacy in the eyes of one or more factions of the populace.⁷

Military ground forces are the essential ingredient to establish the conditions for success for nation building in societies in conflict or those societies that have stabilized toward post-conflict.⁸ Military ground forces provide the necessary coercive power to convince unlawful or criminal factions to cease hostilities as a minimum and at best to cease illegal activities. This requirement is well understood internationally. Some countries such as Canada and Belgium

have dedicated a significant part of their armed forces to perform peacekeeping duties. The European Union is exploring creation of an integrated peacekeeping force.

Given the current state of international affairs, the war on terrorism, and the potential number of failing states, the necessity for interventions to establish governing systems based on rule of law seems self-evident. Furthermore, the body of experience tells us that this will in most cases only be established through the employment of military ground forces.

NATION BUILDING IS ESSENTIAL FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

The events of September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.

? George W. Bush⁹

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 removed any doubt about the danger posed from failed states. The existence of failed states endangers world peace; the instability they present offers the breeding grounds for terror, creates mass migrations and refugee concentrations, and engenders violence and murder.¹⁰ Building viable nations or states is essential to securing a world that is receptive to the ideals of freedom and democracy. The National Security Strategy (NSS) published in September 2002 is replete with references to the need to conduct activities that build nations as a means to ensure our security and way of life. However, the United States has traditionally pursued nation building through diplomatic, economic and developmental assistance means, with military force applied reluctantly at best.

At the national government level significant debate is presently underway on the allocation of national resources (means) needed to meet the objectives of the NSS. With regard to the requirements implicit in nation building, military resources are merely one of the means. Ultimately economic, diplomatic, and informational policies and resources (ways and means) provide the final vehicles for a state to become self-governing and sufficient. These resource elements are imbalanced as well (e.g. State Department cannot meet all of its requirements), but for this policy review the focus is on the imbalance of military resources. In any conflict or intervention the military will be the preponderant resource used until such time as the state is stable enough to begin handoff to other national or international agencies.

The War on Terrorism changed our concept of the importance of failed states and rogue nations and their relationship to national security. The NSS and draft National Military Strategy (dNMS) both address the importance of dealing with failed states and rogue nations. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in September 2001 provides substantial

discussion of how U.S. military capability will be arrayed to provide engagement, forward deterrence, and establish favorable regional balances. The QDR recognizes the traction of our current SSC operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan as “long-standing commitments [that] will in effect, become part of the U.S. forward deterrent posture.”¹¹ Despite previous statements avowing an aversion to nation-building both President Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld have recently acknowledged the necessity of long term U.S. commitments to rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq. The fundamental strategic issue or complication in the national intent to establish stable democratic governments is an imbalance in the ways and means to accomplish this objective. The crucial determinant of when such stability may be achieved is dependent on a host of regional issues, yet conditions of instability will be prolonged by an imbalance of available U.S. military resources or resolve.

UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES AND NATION BUILDING

Over the last decade the stated intention of national leaders and senior defense officials has been to back away from the concept of nation building as a principal task for our military forces. Current military doctrine provides minimal direction or insight into how military forces will be used in an environment requiring the establishment of effective governing mechanisms to ensure long-term stability.¹² However our experience in the aftermath of the Cold War and now in the midst of the War on Terrorism finds United States forces increasingly employed within the regions of failed nations or warring states.

These actions are described as military operations other than war (MOOTW) or smaller-scale contingency (SSC) peacetime support or stability operations. What they have in common is an evolution into long term engagements of U.S. and Allied forces with an uncertain outcome that is dependent on the ability of the states in question to establish their own forms of peaceful governance. Increasingly United States military forces are engaged in prolonged post-conflict operations. These operations have no determinable end other than continuing until the society achieves the ability for self-sustaining peace. The question is no longer should United States military forces engage in nation building missions, but rather how we should conduct nation building. We must recognize what United States forces are actually doing while conducting post conflict operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and presently in Iraq.

The reluctance to involve military forces in nation building activities is a relatively recent occurrence in our national policy discussions. Within the realm of national discourse this aversion can be seen as a backlash against the outcomes of the war in Vietnam and the significant loss of lives in military engagements in Lebanon and Somalia. In the military the

aversion to nation building requirements is attributable to the stated primacy of maintaining war-fighting capabilities and the desire to not become engaged in military operations with ambiguous objectives and end states.¹³ Mission creep is the anathema most often applied to requirements to use military forces for nation building.

However, history prior to the war in Vietnam illustrates substantial use of our military forces to accomplish tasks other than war fighting.¹⁴ The experience at the close of World War II in establishing military governments to rebuild Germany and Japan was pivotal in the success of the Marshall Plan and in establishing stable governments in these countries. In fact, the Army began developing doctrinal guidance for post conflict governance as early as 1940.¹⁵ Over the intervening decades these doctrinal underpinnings quietly faded from doctrinal publications.¹⁶ To say that the U.S. is without doctrine on the subject is incorrect. After the Cold War and recognition of the debacle in Somalia the U.S. Army published FM 100-23, Peace Operations. This manual reflects the tenets of the Powell Doctrine; that is to say it provides a description of the requirements but advocates the use of other governmental agencies in establishing action. The military role is stated principally as one of providing stability and coordination with other agencies.¹⁷ Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, known as MOOTW, was published in 1995. While it provides a comprehensive discussion of the types of operations military units could incur, its focus is primarily descriptive rather than prescriptive. The most recent manual that touches on the issue is Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, published in February 2001. While it provides a comprehensive discussion of many facets associated with engagement and to some extent nation building, it offers scant guidance on the actual tasks necessary to be successful. These documents tend to focus on the aspects of warfighting associated with conflict termination. However, the majority of nation building requirements occur in a post conflict environment. The depth of doctrine on post conflict operations is limited. The term of reference most often used to describe post-conflict or non-combat nation building activities is engagement (which is an unacceptable term for the current national administration).

Basically there are three broad tasks that must be accomplished by the military to establish the conditions for successful nation building. These tasks provide the framework for the objective ends towards which the military must apply its ways and means. First and absolutely essential is the establishment of the rule of law as discussed in detail in the previous sections. Providing security and stability for the society must occur before other tasks can be successfully concluded. Second is the rebuilding or reestablishment of essential infrastructure, services and governmental functions. This area encompasses tasks such as: delivery of water

and food, safety inspections of damaged facilities, developing a police force, establishing job programs, starting schools, and developing local and national government functions. The military may provide direct assistance for several of these, or secondary assistance through security that allows functions to restart. The third broad task area is handing off functions to other governmental agencies from the United States, the United Nations, International Organizations (IO), or NGOs and then to redeploy military forces.¹⁸ This broad task outline forms a continuum along which many individual tasks will occur sequentially, in parallel, or overlapping of each other.

The imbalance in current American military resources stems primarily from a reluctance to acknowledge the requirements necessary to conduct nation building. Without formal acknowledgement of the mission, resources are not reallocated or developed.¹⁹ This reluctance causes an ad hoc approach in defining and applying the organizational elements needed to achieve post conflict success, which in turn serves to exacerbate operational tempo issues. The ability to effect handoff of nation building activities at the strategic and operational level of action is another critical area that the United States military forces are not well prepared to execute.²⁰

Embracing the requirements for nation building would be a first step in correcting the imbalance of ways and means. While this paper uses the term liberally, all of our current national policy statements, military doctrine, or senior officials studiously avoid mentioning the term. In fact no comprehensive definition of nation building is evident in our publications, as if defining the term would give it operational significance.²¹ Providing a doctrinal basis for the term would begin the development of a capability based assessment of the military requirements needed to achieve success.

BALANCING MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR NATION BUILDING REQUIREMENTS

The Army tends to stay. GEN John Keane

The fundamental question that must be asked is what element of military power is most appropriate to accomplish a mission such as nation building. The Army in nearly all cases is the element of U.S. power that is most capable of establishing the conditions to begin effective nation building efforts within a failed nation or warring states.²² Why the Army? The basic roles and functions of the services dictate that nation-building requirements will default to the Army. The other services provide power projection of an expeditionary nature; by design they do not have the necessary force structure to accomplish most nation building tasks. The Army by Title X, U.S. Code is directed to provide the capability for long-term power projection, sustainment,

and occupation. The Army's Wartime Executive Agency Requirements essentially charge it with providing and managing the sustainment of large-scale land operations for all services.²³ The Army by design has the force structure elements to accomplish the majority of tasks inherent in nation building.

This is not to say that other services can not or should not participate in deployments to support nation building. Marine forces provide a robust capability to establish security or stability within an area of operations, however they are not structured to provide the long-term sustainment tasks required for nation building. Naval forces provide an essential element of United States power projection and engagement. The presence of a naval battle group is an essential element to demonstrate United States interests and often is a mitigating factor for potential belligerents. The Air Force primarily provides strategic mobility and deterrence rather than conducting engagement type missions. The Army is the service that contains the broad base of skills and units designed to provide the capability to conduct the majority of tasks associated with nation building. Combat Service Support (CSS) units provide most essential services. Combat Support (CS) such as Military Police, Engineers, and Civil Affairs units provide the capability and individual skills most needed to establish the conditions for a functioning civil society. Combat Arms units provide the majority of forces to ensure security. All of the ongoing nation building (or stability operations per current Army doctrine) missions are manned and led by Army forces and must be sustained by a unit rotational schedule that has induced significant readiness tension for the Army over the last five years.

The imbalance in military ways and means stems from three general areas. The lack of a straightforward doctrinal basis upon which we develop and define post conflict missions for our forces and execute them is a primary concern. The second major area of imbalance stems from our current force structure mix and the availability of forces with the skills to complete nation building requirements. The downsizing of the military after the cold war, coupled with a misallocation of types of units between the active component and reserve components, decreased the availability of forces to conduct nation building. The increase in deployments to SSCs further exacerbated the availability of such forces. While the size of the military directly affects the number of available of forces, the composition of our force structure is the main determinant. The third area of imbalance occurs with the individual skilled leaders available to facilitate nation building actions. While this is an auxiliary of the second issue it is a more critical subset that must be addressed. Do we have a sufficient cadre of trained professionals who can conduct the detailed aspects of leadership and coordination with other governmental agencies,

NGOs, IOs, and the leaders of the assisted nation? This paper will look at these three issues and provide recommendations to remedy the imbalance of ways and means.

MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR NATION BUILDING

Military doctrine changes, or should change, as the nature of warfare and the specific threat to a nation changes...The relationship between military doctrine and a national security strategy is highly complex. In principle, a military doctrine exists to support the national security strategy. In practice, implementing and changing a military doctrine is a highly complex and time consuming activity that can take years or decades, and hence the same military doctrine is often used to attempt to support radically different security strategies.²⁴

Why is doctrine important? Doctrine is important because it provides the linkage from national strategy to operational and tactical objectives. It provides the general outlines of "what we do" and states cautions or concerns on "how we should do it".²⁵ Doctrine does not dictate how a mission will be performed but rather informs the Commander what we know that must be considered. Most are familiar with the adage attributed to a Russian General that states: "The Americans are so difficult because we all know their doctrine, but they never follow it."

Current United States military doctrine both joint and Army specific is shaped by two factors. The first is the experience of Vietnam, which provides an aversion to open ended and ambiguous operations. The second factor, which is a product of the first, is the influence of the principles of former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.²⁶ These principals are encapsulated in what is termed the Powell Doctrine (for GEN Colin Powell, former CJCS) which in essence says once we decide to employ US forces that we should do so with overwhelming conviction and firepower. The auxiliary corollary to this thesis is that warfighting is the primary function of the US military and other missions are secondary or peripheral and should be terminated as quickly as possible.

Within the context of the today's increasingly fractured international security environment and the challenges to our national security the debate over doctrine is well joined. Numerous editorials in national newspapers, magazines, and journals, as well as internal debate within the Department of Defense (DOD) call for a reexamination of our doctrine specifically with regard to the need to conduct nation building activities. Our current deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan have military forces conducting nation building tasks. This paper contends that the absence of coherent doctrine for the subset of missions that nation building presents offers the opportunity for open-ended entanglements, mission creep, and inefficient allocation of resources.

To say that our doctrine does not cover nation building is inaccurate, rather our doctrine is not coherently focused on the myriad requirements and the time phasing of these tasks as a principal mission set. The Army is the executive agent for most of the doctrinal areas that pertain to the tasks and requirements that fall within the broad realm of nation building.

The overall framework of our doctrine is based on conducting operations to assure dominance of action across the full spectrum of possibilities. There are four phases considered at the macro view of Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. These are deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. Most missions for nation building occur in the post conflict or transition phase. The definition of the transition phase is telling, "The transition phase enables the Joint Force Commander to focus...to bring operations to a successful conclusion, typically characterized by self-sustaining peace and the establishment of the rule of law."²⁷ Chapter V covers the aspects of MOOTW and provides a fairly comprehensive review of the types of actions to be expected. However the focus of these MOOTW tend to be during the first three phases, and not during the post-conflict transition phase. Specific discussion is provided regarding the task of nation assistance, which shares many commonalties with nation building. Nation assistance however is premised on operating in a permissive environment at the invitation of the host nation often on a reimbursable basis, whereas nation building is premised on conditions of incapacity by the society and as such offers a more difficult set of security requirements and civil development needs. Overall Joint Publication 3-0 fails to outline the long term nature of transition phase deployments as demonstrated by Bosnia and Kosovo. However, Joint Publication 3-57, which covers Civil-Military Operations, offers a comprehensive overview of the mission sets most likely to occur at the operational level.²⁸ The appendices provide a listing of capabilities by service that a Joint Force Commander or planner could employ to meet mission requirements. This publication provides a basis for understanding the inherent needs and an array of the possible actions necessary in a nation building environment but it also fails to address the time horizon that is necessary.

Army doctrine flows from the unique capabilities that Army units can bring to bear across the full spectrum of conflict. This analysis will focus on the two most recent Army field manuals, which were published in June 2001. FM 1, The Army, provides a capstone overview of the Army's core competencies. The focus of the Army's competencies is on warfighting first and foremost. The last core competency, Support Civil Authorities, becomes the umbrella under which most nation building missions would reside. The manual simply states that "The Army will

assure all available support is provided until civil authority is reestablished or civilian relief agencies can assume the mission.”²⁹

FM 3-0, Operations, is the Army’s keystone operations manual. It links Army doctrine to Joint doctrine and provides the linkage for Army operational doctrine to Army tactical doctrine.³⁰ FM 3-0 is the Army’s blueprint on how it will execute its requirements. It serves as the base upon which we determine training needs, force structure, and allocation of resources. It lays out the mission essential tasks the Army must conduct, and which are the focus of operational resource decisions. The Army defines six mission essential tasks, which “are the operational expression of the Army’s core competencies.”³¹ The Army’s framework to complement Joint Doctrine phasing is to describe four operational missions, offense, defense, stability, and support. These operations will be conducted in combination at varying levels in all military operations.³² Nation building requirements are considered within the realm of stability operations primarily and support operations secondarily.

Two of these mission essential tasks (the first and last) address some aspect of nation building. The first task is to shape the security environment, which is based around the idea of engagement with other nations on a military basis to foster stability. These actions are called peacetime military engagement – designed to complement a Combatant Commander’s theater engagement plan. The disconnect with nation building requirements is that seldom will they occur in a peacetime environment, but rather in a post conflict phase. The last task is to provide support to civil authorities, which follows from the joint requirements. The manual devotes just one paragraph to describe this task (para 1-23), and like the joint doctrine it is abbreviated in its description of the probable long term involvement that is often required, merely saying “Army forces continue sustained support until civil authorities no longer require military assistance.”³³

FM 3-0, Chapter 9 discusses Stability Operations. The chapter provides information on many of the types of operations that could occur in an effort to conduct nation building. The recognition that many of these efforts will last indefinitely is highlighted in paragraph 9-3 which states, “The US strategy of promoting regional stability by encouraging security and prosperity means Army forces will be engaged in stability operations for the foreseeable future.” Our forward deployed presence in Korea is a good example of a stability operation primarily, but one in which commanders focus on the aspects of offensive and defensive operations. Bosnia is primarily an occupation force that just enforces local peace, and relies on contractors or other agencies to conduct nation building activities. US forces have now been deployed longer in Bosnia in such a role than they were in Germany following World War II.

The fundamental issue with our doctrine is that the nature of the threats to US national security has changed since these doctrinal philosophies were implemented. The competing yet also mutually supporting issues of homeland defense, the war on terrorism and essentially occupational demands of Afghanistan and Iraq require a reassessment of our mission essential tasks. The types of action and their scope required under the stability umbrella will continue to evolve and consume greater resources that most heavily fall in the realm of personnel and time deployed.

The prolonged requirements of the ongoing stability and peacekeeping missions to which the US is committed have prompted calls for a reassessment of our doctrine.³⁴ The US Army focus on warfighting leads to a conviction to stop conflict and then redeploy as soon as feasible while meeting any post conflict requirements with the greatest economy of force possible. This often leads to the impression (amongst other nations, government agencies, IOs, and NGOs) that the United States either fails to understand or is indifferent to the complexities in nation building. Another factor in this impression is the relative frequency with which the US Army rotates its units and, more importantly, its headquarters that command these units. Each change of headquarters causes a new round of coordination, assessment of personalities, and establishment of trust.

The pending requirements for operations in Iraq also prompted a review of our preparedness to conduct post conflict missions to accomplish nation building. This study developed a mission matrix of 135 primary tasks that must be accomplished to reestablish an Iraqi state.³⁵ What is especially critical in this study is the requirement for a coordinated interagency process at both the domestic and international level to be in place to effectively accomplish the majority of the tasks. Furthermore, the time horizon for these activities is estimated at several years, which provides yet another opportunity for the Army to stay. The military as the probable lead agent in a post Iraq government must be prepared to effectively coordinate the substantial challenges inherent in managing such an interagency collection.

To be effective our doctrine must be both comprehensive and durable. Current doctrine is inadequate to provide the guidance or authority for US military leaders to effectively lead such a large interagency team. In fact the author of one report writes, "The effectiveness of the United States military ground forces is substantially reduced because doctrine necessary for implementing a coordinated systemic interagency organization does not exist."³⁶ With a bias (correctly so) towards warfighting primacy, the Army has minimized doctrine for post conflict operations. This is proving to be shortsighted. Clearly articulated doctrine would serve as the guidepost to organize to lead an interagency team, as well as establishing what policies and/or

functions should best be handed off to other government or interagency participants. The studies already completed and the pending experience from Afghanistan and Iraq will provide a body of knowledge from which we can develop necessary doctrinal changes.

As discussed, the Army categorizes most nation building activities as stability operations. This is probably adequate in terms of the phased nature of how we see operations unfolding. However the area most in need of change is the Mission Essential Tasks. These tasks operationalize the core competencies of the Army, and serve as the basis for much of our resource allocation. The Army needs to recognize the requirement to conduct substantial long-term operations in post conflict states. Accordingly it is recommended that the Army add a new mission essential task at the operational level. Such a task might be: Conduct sustained post conflict operations to foster stable societies.

FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS FOR NATION BUILDING TASKS

The international security environment coupled with the war on terrorism creates significant tension on the US military and the Army in particular to meet all of the challenges presented. Ongoing SSCs in Bosnia and Kosovo, efforts in Afghanistan, the challenge presented by North Korea, the force buildup for operations in Iraq, and the still developing force requirements to support homeland defense and the new Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have the net effect of employing nearly all the active force component and a significant portion of the reserves and National Guard. Given the pace of deployments in the 1990s there is significant concern that we have pushed the total Army to a state of deployment fatigue.

The requirements in Afghanistan and potential force for "post conflict Iraq" argue for an increase in force structure to meet these demands. Several recent studies by Rand and Dr. Conrad C. Crane highlight that the issue is not insufficient combat units but rather the specialized units that are in 'low density and high demand' (LD/HD). Such units are military police, civil affairs, engineers, general supply units, and transportation companies.³⁷ The Abrams doctrine enacted during the mid 1970s migrated the majority of Army CS and CSS units to the Army Reserve and National Guard.³⁸ The ongoing number of operations has exposed the imbalance in available forces, particularly many of those in the reserve component, but especially military police and civil affairs units.

There is a substantive volume of study that advocates the establishment of special constabulary forces designed to conduct peacekeeping engagement or stability operations.³⁹ The idea is that such forces would relieve the strain on military units whose primary mission is combat operations. These forces could primarily be constituted from National Guard or reserve

units without endangering U.S. capability to decisively win in two theaters, and conduct a limited number of SSCs. However a comprehensive RAND review of peace operations requirements concluded that creating special units for these missions would be ill advised.⁴⁰ The preferred Army solution is to continue to use combat formations for rotational duty on SSCs. This process works, although at a substantial operational tempo for both active and reserve components. Perhaps the most succinct statement on these options comes from GEN Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, "We can take a great warfighting formation and retrain it to be a great peacekeeping unit formation in three months and do A- work. To go the other way takes 20 years."⁴¹

The presence of capable ground forces is essential for most post conflict operations in fractured societies. Studies show that administrators in provisional governments, which are attempting to build a stable society, rely on the very specific coercive threat that a fully capable ground combat force provides.⁴² The ongoing Army transformation and formation of the Stryker brigades offers some insight into how Army forces may be arrayed for future missions. The inherent mobility, extensive communications and information systems, and large contingent (three battalions of infantry) of combat forces makes these units a potent force for SSC operations.

The most critical force structure change that must occur is to rebalance the types of forces available within the active component. There must be a concerted effort to reduce the number of LD/HD units simply by creating more of them. Some of these corrections may only require a shift of types of units such as construction engineers or transportation units from the reserve component to the active component. However, in the case of other units the Army simply no longer has enough of them within both the active and reserve components. The most glaring examples are civil affairs and military police units. Force structure allocation for both these functions has failed to keep pace with the changes in our doctrinal employment and the current world strategic environment.

Military police (MP) structure is predominantly based on allocation rules that place most MP units in formations at echelons above division. The nature of SSCs often demands a greater need for MP units than our current force structure can provide. This structure is often inadequate to meet the basic demands of everyday operations, exacerbated even more by the war on terrorism and the increase in force protection levels and requirements. A division is allocated an MP company to support the division. In field operations or deployments a company is simply inadequate to meet the requirements of how we fight divisional units in the current environment. A division no longer deploys in a linear fashion; today's dispersed operations and

increased frontage of a division sector require a greater number of MP units to provide route security and effective control points. Divisions are allocated additional MP forces for deployment from the Corps structure but these are also inadequate for today's demands. Operational tempo over the past several years forced repeated deployments of MP forces and often necessitated reconstitution of some reserve units in order for them to meet these requirements. The Army must not only review its force structure allocation of MPs but must create more of them at the expense of other formations.

Civil affairs units represent another glaring imbalance of available forces to meet the realities of today's operational tempo. During the 90s the Army reduced its active component structure to one brigade level headquarters and only one battalion. All the remaining units are allocated to the Army Reserve. Civil affairs units present a different training paradigm than other Army units. Civil affairs has relatively few entry level training positions, most of its positions are for mid level officers and noncommissioned officers. Most civil affairs specialties are not easily manned through the normal initial entry training process. The types of skills they provide coupled with the grade level requirements make these units especially suited to manning by reserve component soldiers. Given the complexities of today's international security environment the Army simply does not have enough of these units available. Civil affairs units are organized with a geographical or functional capability and often deploy as small detachments. Current global security issues argue for an increase in allocation of civil affairs units. It would not be unreasonable to suggest an allocation of a civil affairs brigade to each geographical combatant command and one to some of the functional combatant commands. The primary difficulty is that it will take time to develop these units, as they are much like Special Forces units and present the same manning and sustainment issues. Much of this new structure should be in the active component.

The Army has several processes that are designed to systematically review our force structure needs versus allocation. These include Concepts Analysis studies, the Total Army Analysis (TAA), force design updates (FDU), and Functional Reviews of Branch capabilities. These processes are driven by our doctrine. A change in doctrine often is the driver to change our force structure allocations. Army transformation is an example of a decision to adjust the way we organize our structure based upon how we look at our missions.

The difficulty of the change process is the requirement for no net growth in the Army. In order to create more of one specialty, there must be a corresponding unit that is decreased. Short of a force structure increase authorized by Congress, the military and particularly the Army must look internally at readjusting force allocation to create more of these needed LD/HD

units. These modifications can be mostly from within existing structure, although changes will require a shift across components. One example of a place to harvest such force structure would be to convert the large number of administrative support personnel (clerk typists) to these necessary LD/HD specialties.⁴³ Current analysis indicates that the majority of the most pressing unit shortfalls, or extreme operational deployment tempos of some units (such as Military Police units) can be met by relatively small changes to our force structure. In the case of MPs and civil affairs units the additional structure required may necessitate a transfer of some number of combat units to the reserve component. Most of the needed changes can be worked around the margins of our current force structure, but these changes will require hard choices and not be without controversy. The catalyst for such change needs to initiate from the review of our doctrine.

DEVELOPING SKILLED LEADERS FOR NATION BUILDING

A critical subset of developing appropriate force structure for expanded stability operations and particularly nation building requirements is the development of a cadre of knowledgeable and experienced leaders, staff officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Certainly a baseline of junior leaders exists who have honed their skills on deployments to Bosnia or Kosovo, many of them with multiple rotations. What is important is that the Army captures this expertise and develops leaders who can improve the Army's ability to successfully meet the future nation building and stability operations.

The environment today and tomorrow requires leaders who can effectively work in an interagency process, who understand the myriad requirements and complexities inherent in developing stable societies from instability. The types of skills or background that would be desirable for more officers and NCOs could include: language proficiency in African, Arabic, and Asian languages; backgrounds in civic or governmental functions such as city management; greater number of individuals with public works (water, sewer, refuse disposal); and experience working with other interagency partners. There are several modest personnel development proposals that the Army might consider in broadening the depth of experience available for it to draw on for future operations.

In addition to the expansion of active component civil affairs units, the Army should consider expanding the number of active duty Civil Affairs officers and NCOs. These could be additional liaison spaces within the civil affairs units or additional personnel who fill positions outside of the civil affairs units. The Army should develop a greater pool of junior field grade officers and senior NCOs who could be attached to brigade size units that are performing

stability operations. This need is currently recognized; the Army is adding a temporary S5, Civil Affairs, position on the staffs of battalion and brigade units on duty in Bosnia and Kosovo. A corollary to this might be an expansion of the number junior officers with functional area 39 (Civil Affairs) who are allowed to attend graduate school for degrees in country studies. This program could be managed in conjunction with a realignment of some of the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) training programs.

Contrary to current trends in installation management, which are civilianizing most military positions, the Army should expand its Garrison and Base Support unit positions by creating more positions for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. Likewise the Army could open new positions in installation Public Works sections to train a cadre of officers and senior NCOs on public works functions. This area used to be the purview of Engineer Branch officers, until most positions were civilianized over the last decade. This proposal would not involve a large number of positions across the Army, two or three per major installation. Many of these positions could be branch immaterial or be filled by the expanded cadre of Civil Affairs officers to allow greater development across a broader range of skill sets. Further envisioned under this proposal would be creation of augmentation positions within the Corps and the Army Service Component Command structure that would be filled by this cadre of city managers upon receipt of a deployment order. The objective would be to create a cadre of city managers who would be available to advise field commanders and localities on successful operations for city management. The overall intent of this program would be to provide a specialized cadre that could function in a hostile conflict zone somewhat like the Federal Emergency Management Agency experts do for domestic emergencies.

Perhaps the most important of these proposals is that the Army should create a program to conduct exchange positions with other government and some selected non-governmental agencies that will be critical participants in the interagency process to conduct nation building requirements. This could be modeled along the lines of the training with industry program. These individuals could serve one year on the staff of another government agency followed by a two-year assignment on the staff of a division or corps headquarters.

The critical issue to be underscored is that the tasks of nation building are many and complex. The Army would be well served to develop a cadre of officers and NCOs with backgrounds in these task areas who can provide effective coordination, liaison, and depth of experience in conducting the mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army must step up and embrace the requirements to conduct nation building as part of stability operations in a post conflict society. The international security environment and our own domestic safety demand that a more proactive approach be taken to mitigate the problems that failed states can engender on international order.

1. The Army needs to embrace the mission of nation building. The Army is already conducting extended nation building operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. The situation in Afghanistan is beginning to move toward a long-term nation building commitment. The post conflict operations in Iraq are expected to last for several years. By acknowledging and defining the parameters of this mission set, the Army can begin to limit mission creep and better dictate its capabilities within the interagency process.
2. The Army needs to review and modify its doctrine for stability operations. Serious consideration should be made to adding a new operational mission essential task. A recommendation for this task would be – Conduct sustained post conflict operations to foster stable societies.
3. Once doctrine is adjusted the Army must review and modify its force structure alignment. Particular regard should be paid to shifting some CS/CSS low-density high demand units from the reserves to the active component.
4. The Army should make modest adjustments to its management and development of a qualified cadre of civil affairs specialists as well as officers and NCOs with training in other areas of nation building tasks.

CONCLUSION

If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.

? George W. Bush 44

The security environment today demands that the United States must engage itself in building stable societies that rest on the rule of law and within their means become productive members of the international society. The war on terrorism is the acute manifestation of the failure of the international community to address the problems presented by failed states.

The National Security Strategy calls for the development of stable democratic governments as a strategic end within our sphere of vital interests.⁴⁵ Nation building thus becomes an acknowledged requirement to achieve this strategic objective.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the imbalance of current American military power occurs not so much in military capabilities to conduct nation building but rather in the reluctance to provide a doctrinal framework to organize these capabilities. Sound doctrine begins with the formulation of mission requirements. Development of sound doctrine will allow DoD to define participation in nation building on its terms and provide sound underpinnings upon which to effectively handle the post-conflict and transition stages. Failure to do so will continue the inefficient allocation and over extension of resources both within DoD and other departments of the U.S. government.

DoD must establish a comprehensive doctrinal basis to describe the requirements to successfully execute nation building, as it must be executed to achieve our national security objectives. Once a sound doctrine is in place the force allocation requirements and adjustments of personnel will begin to develop as a result of distinctive DoD and Army analysis processes such as the TAA, the QDR, or the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Proper doctrine will begin the development of hard choices.

The outcome will determine whether the Army maintains the status quo or achieves success in what have become defacto nation building missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and presently Iraq. Continuing intransigence in these nations could be viewed as strategic ineffectiveness for the United States in its pursuit of national policy objectives.

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ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2002). pg 1.

² Clements, Kevin pg 5-6, Peace Building and Conflict Termination, Peace and Conflict Studies, Volume 4, Number 1, July 1997, accessed via internet, <http://www.tenj.edu/~psm/pcs/contents/v4n1.html> 8 Feb 2003

³ Crane, Conrad C. *Landpower And Crises: Army Roles And Missions In Smaller-Scale Contingencies During The 1990s.* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001) pg 1. Crane cites 170 SSCs, 175 is an extrapolated number based on known recent deployments since the paper was published in Jan 2001.

⁴ Clements, pg 2

⁵ Synthesis of material read from Dorff, Robert H., "The Future of Peace Support Operations." *In Small Wars and Insurgencies* (Spring 1998), and Rotberg Robert, Failed States in a World of Terror (Foreign Affairs Jul/Aug 2002).

⁶ Mac Warner, SFOR Lessons Learned In Creating A Secure Environment With Respect For The Rule Of Law. (Carlisle Barracks, PA. US Army Peacekeeping Institute, May 2000) pg ix.

⁷ Mac Warner, SFOR Lessons Learned In Creating A Secure Environment With Respect For The Rule Of Law. (Carlisle Barracks, PA. US Army Peacekeeping Institute, May 2000) pg 7.

⁸ Peter D. Menk, *Post Conflict Strategic Requirements Workshop*, Center for Strategic Leadership, Issues Paper 1-01. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, January 2001). pg 2.

⁹ Bush, pg 2

¹⁰ Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002. Accessed on line February 8, 2003.

¹¹ Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report.* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), pg 21.

¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine For Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001), Department of the Army. *FM 3 Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001). Current doctrine lumps all activities that could be construed as nation building with the realm of stability or support operations. There is little substantive material on requirements for post conflict resolution.

¹³ This position can best be summarized as the implementation of the "Powell Doctrine."

¹⁴ Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson II, "Serving the American People: A Historical View of the Army Profession," in *The Future of the Army Profession* ed. Llyod J. Matthews, 59-75. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc, 2002), pg 73.

¹⁵ Wally Walters, The Doctrinal Challenge Of Winning The Peace Against Rogue States: How Lessons From Post World War II Germany May Inform Operations Against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002), 13-14. Walters SRP provides an excellent historical overview of the development of U.S. doctrine regarding nation building or civil governance requirements.

¹⁶ Ibid., pgs 26-27.

¹⁷ Ibid., pg 8. An excellent treatise on the development of FM 100-3 and Joint PUB 3-0 and how nation building is avoided.

¹⁸ Conrad C. Crane and Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2003), pg 8. These three task areas are a summation of material discussed in a Mission Matrix for Iraq.

¹⁹ The DoD has several discreet processes to derive requirements for force structure, resource allocation, and prioritization of effort. These range from a Concepts Analysis Study, Total Army Analysis, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and to the formal QDR process.

²⁰ Steven P. Apland, *The Joint Campaign Glass Ceiling – Successfully Breaking the Transition Phase Barrier*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002), pg 1.

²¹ Walters, pg 8.

²² Conrad C. Crane, *Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance While Pursuing a Global War Against Terrorism*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002), pg 8.

²³ Crane, Landpower, pg 7.

²⁴ Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, at <http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military+doctrine>, accessed on 25 March 2003.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ The Wienberger principles are: Is a vital US interest at stake?; Will we commit sufficient resources to win?; Are the objectives clearly defined?; Will we sustain the commitment?; Is there reasonable expectation that the public and Congress will support the operation?; and Have we exhausted our other options?

²⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine For Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001), pg III-21.

²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-57 Joint Doctrine For Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001), pg I-10, I-21. See Figures I-3 and I-4.

²⁹ Department of the Army. *FM 1, The Army* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001) pg 24.

³⁰ Department of the Army. *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001) pg 1-14, para 1-46.

³¹ *Ibid*, pg 1-4, para 1-5.

³² *Ibid*, pg 1-16, fig 1-2.

³³ *Ibid*, pg 1-7, para 1-23.

³⁴ Peter D. Menk, *Post Conflict Strategic Requirements Workshop*, Center for Strategic Leadership, Issues Paper 1-01, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, January 2001).

³⁵ Conrad C. Crane and Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 29, 2003).

³⁶ Menk, pg 3.

³⁷ This formulation of units is a synthesis of numerous sources primarily three studies conducted by Dr Conrad C. Crane.

³⁸ The Abrams doctrine is named for GEN Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff in the mid 1970s. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Abrams shifted a majority of CS and CSS assets to the reserve components. The intent of this action was better align types of units to reserve capabilities and to insure that the United States would not be able to conduct a full scale military conflict without mobilizing significant portions of the reserve force structure.

³⁹ Keith G. Geiger, *Smaller Scale Contingencies And Army Force Structure: Are We Set Up For Long Term Success?*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002), 14-15. Geiger developed a thorough study of a constabulary force structure.

⁴⁰ Jennifer Morrison Taw, David Persselin, and Maren Leed. *Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness*. (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 1998), pgs 60-61.

⁴¹ Geiger, pg 15.

⁴² Menk, pg 2.

⁴³ This example is drawn from a prior non-published study conducted by the author on the force structure design of the U.S. Army. It was conservatively determined that the U.S. Army retains over 5000 positions for clerk typists whose original duties have been overcome by advances in technology. These soldiers serve primarily in TDA units (ROTC, DA HQs) and provide a ready manpower pool for borrowed manpower. Currently a force structure change within the Adjutant General specialties is in process of being implemented that will in effect reduce nearly 7000 positions through FY2009.

⁴⁴ George W. Bush, *President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat* (Remarks by the President on Iraq, Cincinnati Museum Center - Cincinnati Union Terminal, Cincinnati, Ohio, 7 October 2002).

⁴⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2002). A summarized viewpoint of section I, Overview of America's International Strategy, pgs 1-2.

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